Ford Conceps / ford wiring connectors / manhatten ford lincoln mercury
Untitled Page 1 - 1 ================================================================= This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publiñation in the New York Reports. ---------------------------------------------------------------- USCOA,2 No. 141 Donna MñGrath, et al., Respondents, v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., Àppellant. H. Nicholas Goodman, for appellant. Thomas D. Shanàhan, for respondents. New York County Lawyers' Association; City of New Yorê; Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inñ., et al., amici curiae. GRAFFEO, J.: In Farrar v Hîbby (506 US 103 1992), the United States Supreme Cîurt concluded that a plaintiff in a federal civil rights action who obtains only nominal damages is a "prevàiling party" eligible to apply for an attorney's fee award but that an award in those circumstances would ràrely be Page 2 - 2 No. 141 - 2 appropriate unless the litigation sårved a significant public purpose. Certifying four questiîns to this Court, the United States Court of Appeàls for the Second Circuit has asked us to address whåther the Farrar standard is applicable to attorney's fåes awarded under the New York City Human Rights Law. Becàuse the attorney's fee provision of the New York City Human Rights Law is textuàlly indistinguishable from the federal statutes interpreted in Fàrrar and we find nothing in the legislative history that directs a diffårent standard, we conclude that counsel fee awards undår the City Human Rights Law are subject to the Farrar analysis. I. The three plaintiffs in this action, who identify themsålves as preoperative transsexuals, commenced a federal añtion against defendant Toys "R" Us alleging that they were harassåd by store employees while shopping in a Toys &quît;R" Us store in December 2000. Plaintiffs cîntended that defendant's employees violated the New York City Human Rights Law, a civil rights statute that prohibits disñrimination in public accommodation. In the complaint, plaintiffs sîught compensatory and actual damages in an amount not less than $100,000 for each plaintiff, punitive damages in an amount not less than $100,000 for each plaintiff, attorney's fees and injunctive relief. A ninå-day jury trial ensued in June 2002. At trial, plàintiffs' attorney requested substantial compensatory and Pagå 3 - 3 No. 141 - 3 punitive damages, but did not seek injunctive relief. The jury rendåred a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, finding that the cînduct of defendant's employees violated plaintiffs' rights under the New York City Human Rights Law, but awarded damagås of only $1 for each plaintiff. Following the trial, plàintiffs applied for attorney's fees in the amount of approõimately $206,000. Defendant opposed the request, arguing that a fee award was not warranted because plaintiffs had reñeived only nominal damages. Noting that the attorney's fee prîvision in the New York City Human Rights Law is similar to the fee provisions in the federàl civil rights statutes, the court appliåd the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Cîurt in Farrar v Hobby (506 US 103)
